The mission order briefs the why, who, what, where, when of the mission, but not necessarily how. In Sabinskis mind, he was well aware of the risk of returning to the area of initial contact. And with that necessary evil comes a necessarily great mission commander. The goal of shared understanding is that commanders, staffs, and unified action partners will possess a shared understanding of their operational environment, the operations purpose, problems, and approaches to solving them. By July the tactical-level units from the 10th Mountain Division and the 101st Airborne Division, including TF Rakkasan, had all The firefight was over in minutes; of the 18 al-Qaeda fighters, 16 were killed and two were wounded. Pay Online. Mission command is accomplished through the execution of staff tasks that are defined by the commander tasks and these tasks define the mission command warfighting function. The MH-47Es carrying the SEALs caught up to their targets: the lead Chinook landed in front of the convoy; as the occupants leapt out of their vehicles, the door gunner hosed the vehicles down with his minigun, cutting down a number of al-Qaeda terrorists; the second Chinook overshot the column and raked it with minigun fire as it passed. Around midnight, the units of TF Hammer loaded into their vehicles and left their base in Gardez at 333558N 691344E / 33.59944N 69.22889E / 33.59944; 69.22889 (Gardez) for the Shahi-Kot Valley. . Mako 30 was forced off the peak due to the heavy fire and damage done. The rockets would automatically detonate at 920 meters, catching helicopters in flak bursts (a tactic learned in the Soviet-Afghan War). As a result, they did not fire and the CH-47 made an entry similar to the first, this time successfully landing the team on the ground amidst heavy machine gun and rocket fire while taking some casualties. [13][pageneeded] The amount of conventional assets allowed in Afghanistan was limited by United States Central Command (CENTCOM) and civilian defense leadership. TF Hammer consisted of AMF and special operators as the primary effort to assault the Shahi-Kot Valley; their objective was to enter the valley from the north, assaulting through the villages of Serkhankheyl and Marzak, where intelligence indicated that the enemy was concentrated, and channel fleeing enemy into the TF Rakkasan blocking positions. The forces used, consisting of the 187th Infantry Regiment ("Rakkasans") of the 101st Airborne Division, led by Colonel Frank Wiercinski, and soldiers of 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division, led by Lieutenant Colonel Paul LaCamera, were to be inserted by CH-47D Chinooks, supported by 6 AH-64A Apache helicopters and secure these blocking positions. Throughout the day, the TACP forward air controllers and Special Forces teams that had infiltrated into the area the previous day assisted in calling in airstrikes from B-1, B-52, F-15, F-18 and F-16 aircraft, inflicting heavy casualties on the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, but by no means silencing them. [16], SOF teams from Task Force K-Bar and Task Force 64, which included: Navy SEALs from SEAL Teams 2, 3 and 8, Green Berets from 3rd SFG, The Canadian Army's Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2), The German Army's Kommando Spezialkrfte (KSK), the Norwegian special forces units Forsvarets Spesialkommando (FSK) and Marinejegerkommandoen (MJK), elements of the Australian Special Air Service Regiment and the New Zealand Special Air Service and the Danish special forces from Jgerkorpset. A rocket-propelled grenade then hit the helicopter, destroying the right engine and forcing it to crash land. Through threat of nearby enemy response elements, hypothermia and shock of wounded personnel, and across nearly 30" of snow in extreme terrain, Mako 21 found a site suitable for an MH-47. The operators recovered a lot of US military equipment: a US-made suppressor, a number of US fragmentation grenades issued to TF 11 and a Garmin handheld GPS, later traced to the crew of Razor 01. On February 28, on the eve of the operation, three AFO teams were covertly infiltrated into the valley, one codenamed Juliet was made up of 5 Delta operators with a signals intelligence specialist from the ISA, entered the valley on ATVs from the north, driving through the night in adverse weather conditions, eventually reaching a covert hide on the eastern side of the valley. At 06:30 the first wave of Rakkasans and Mountain troops landed via Chinook helicopter along the eastern and northern edges of the valley to await the fleeing fighters at their assigned blocking positions. Lang, Katie. We are left learning the following about Operation Anaconda. Soldiers also recovered two AK-47 assault rifles, one magazine and 707,000 Iraqi dinar, equal to about $600. SOF teams from Task Force K-Bar and Task Force 64 also inserted into the valley to establish observation posts which according to US planners "had to be tenable, afford good reconnaissance, and cover the identified escape routes or 'rat lines' into Pakistan"[19], Near H-Hour, Mako 31 found a group of foreign fighters that had established a position and were manning a DShK HMG on the peak where they planned to set up an observation post. and mutual trust between the DRA and the Soviet forces. Mako 30 and Lt. Cmdr. The events that took place during Operation Anaconda have shown that misapplication of thorough organizational principles can cause unnecessary loss of life and equipment. Mission Command in Operation Anaconda: An Analysis (Essay Sample) Instructions: Analyze and evaluate the major points of your case study for research to write your persuasive essay. The cause of the conflict is said to have been the complaint of some U.S. soldiers that the KSK soldiers had only changed their position when a shepherd stumbled into their hideout instead of killing him. [37] They were replaced by CTF 82, formed from the headquarters of the 82d Airborne Division and led by the division's commander, Major General John R. Vines. The operation took place in the Shahi-Kot Valley and Arma Mountains southeast of Zormat. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of UKEssays.com. (LogOut/ (1) Even though headquarters published the warning order on 6 January, the Combined Force Air Component . departed Afghanistan; the CTF Mountain headquarters staff followed in early September. Hyder saw the need to assist Mako 21 who at that time had two dead and two injured, one of them non-ambulatory. These six principles are as follows; build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commanders intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk. It was decided to use U.S. conventional infantry. Australian SASR soldiers had infiltrated the area prior to the first helicopter crash undetected as part of a long range reconnaissance mission when the Chinooks went down. The way the operation was planned and executed highlighted the need for a paradigm shift in the way the U.S. conducted military operations. U.S. forces had estimated the strength of the rebels in the Shahi-Kot Valley at 150 to 200, but later information suggested the actual strength was of 500 to 1,000 fighters. [8] Malawi Nasrullah Mansoor later joined the Taliban, becoming governor of Paktia Province before being killed in a battle with a rival warlord. This action earned him the Congressional Medal of Honor. At the end of the first day of battle when the Troops returned to base for inspections; they realized that all of them had been hit by multiple enemy bullets (p. 15). Disclaimer: This is an example of a student written essay.Click here for sample essays written by our professional writers. [26], It is not certain whether the sailor died immediately or was killed by opposing soldiers. "Not a Good Day to Die" Penguin Group (New York), 2014: Holmes, Tony. Instead of 150-200 fighters in the valley as expected, post assessment held that the area contained 750 to 1,000 terrorists dug in on the high ground around the valley. Introduction Begun and completed in 2002, operation Anaconda became the largest operation held in Afghanistan under United States' tactical management. The mission command philosophy is executed through the mission command warfighting function, which basically consists of a series of mutually supporting tasks. Adamec, W. Ludwig. This authority would be delegated to subordinate commanders that ultimately shared one common intent. Counterinsurgency: The operation, carried out by Soldiers of Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, was part of the continuous effort to sweep out insurgent strongholds. This was the first operation in the Afghanistan theater to involve a large number of U.S. forces participating in direct combat activities. Thus, changing the approach to all future engagements and how they would be governed. The operators and an assigned CSAR team boarded 3 MH-47Es while the Rangers climbed aboard a pair of MH-60G Blackhawks, launching from Bagram in the early morning. Finally, between several generals including SOF generals; the principle of shared understanding is exemplified as they agreed that command and control would be more effective under a conventional generalship under General Franks with SOF as a support element (Lambeth p. 167-168). [9], In February 2002, a Special Forces intelligence analyst working for Task Force Bowie began to identify patterns that led him to believe that surviving al-Qaeda forces were massing in the Lower Shahikot Valley, some 60 miles south of Gardez. They were able to establish communications via a line-of-sight radio with the teams of the AFO positioned around the Takur Ghar, taking advantage of the AFO's knowledge of enemy movements in real time. Create a free website or blog at WordPress.com. An enemy counterattack midday mortally wounded Senior Airman Jason D. Cunningham, a pararescueman. The TF 11 element assigned to the mission included SEAL operators from DEVGRU (commanded by the SEAL who led the Mako 30 mission on Takur Ghar) and attached British SBS operators, with a mixed force of Rangers as back up. The commanders intent is usually given with the principle of mission orders. TF Rakkasan and TF Hammer fought all day with the AFO teams calling in continuous airstrikes on al-Qaeda positions while Apaches protected the Rakkasans on the valley floor. Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Adaption in, Battle. The men on the floor of the valley then picked up and began to patrol north again moving another 50 or so meters when an RPG was fired off a low foothill to the east. Other units that took part are the B Co. 159th Avn Rgt, 75th Ranger Regiment,[18] Joint Special Operations Command and CIA's Special Activities Division and British Royal Marines. A convoy led by Army Chief Warrant Officer Stanley L. Harriman of the Third Special Forces Group split off from the main TF Hammer force to reach the assigned observation point. Operation Anaconda took place in early March 2002 in the Shahi-Kot Valley and Arma Mountains southeast of Zormat, Afghanistan .This operation was the first large-scale battle in the United. Mission command philosophy is guided by six principles. Joint Planning During Operation Anaconda Operation Anaconda was the first large-scale Army combat operation that was carried out as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. While air force jets provided suppressive fire on the mountain top with individual gun runs since Mako 30 was less than 100 metres (110yd) north of the peak and Chalk 1 with its downed MH-47 was less than 100 m south of the peak. View all posts by Yskander Arquimides Saucedo. Operation Anaconda was a military battle carried out against al Qaeda and Taliban forces. The surviving crew and quick-reaction force took cover in a hillock and a fierce firefight began. The AC-130 was then directed to attack the large groupings of enemy combatants currently exposed on top of the mountain, one to three minutes before the Mako 30 was scheduled to arrive. Even though all overhead imagery showed no signs of life on the peak of Takur Ghar, LCDR Hyder gave the team final guidance per SOP that if any signs were seen, mission would be aborted. The U.S. forces estimated they had killed at least 500 fighters over the duration of the battle, however journalists later noted that only 23 bodies were found and critics suggested that after a couple days, the operation "was more driven by media obsession, than military necessity".

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